It has been a tumultuous year for air travel in the United States, marked by winding TSA lines, air traffic control-related delays, skyrocketing fuel prices, and intensifying rivalries among the United States’ dominant “big four” carriers. 

Those big four—Delta, American, Southwest, and United Airlines—control a whopping 80 percent of the air travel industry. This increasingly oligopolistic industry, paired with Iran war-related fuel prices skyrocketing, has driven soaring ticket prices, fee hikes, and what feels like deregulation.

Last week, Delta, American, and United all decided to increase checked-bag fees by $10 (to $45, $50, and $50, respectively) for the first bag, with steeper hikes for second and third bags.

Delta leads the industry with nearly $64 billion in revenue and $6 billion in profits for 2025. The airline has also worked to define itself through an aggressive push into premium travel, announcing new nonstops to destinations like Malta, upgrading its Delta Sky Club lounges, and introducing a new ultra-luxe “Delta One” business class product.

Nevertheless, underscoring how widespread rising oil costs have become, CEO Ed Bastian announced that, beyond increased checked-bag fees, Delta will cut growth by 3.5 percent, and customers should expect higher fares.

By contrast, American Airlines struggled to meet high demand with high margins. While seeing all-time revenue highs of nearly $55 billion, they only managed to turn $111 million into profits—far from Delta.

Reflecting operational struggles, criticism of inconsistent onboard service and high complaint volumes, the airline has recently ranked low in customer satisfaction. Union leaders representing American Airlines flight attendants and pilots have called for the removal of CEO Robert Isom and a “credible turnaround strategy.”

In light of this, American introduced an upgraded “Flagship business class” product on select transatlantic flights and began rolling out needed cabin refreshes on regional aircraft.

United largely fell in the middle, earning a record $59 billion in revenue and $3.5 billion in profits. Alongside its upgraded “Polaris” business class, it introduced a new “basic” Polaris fare—a lower-cost, no-frills version that charges for seat selection, limits flexibility, and removes lounge access.

United has also been forced to grapple with operational strain at key hubs. Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), its primary East Coast hub handling 60 percent of passengers, was hit hard by the October 2025 government shutdown, with ATC staffing shortages and aging systems triggering delays.

At Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD), United is pushing capacity in the opposite direction, announcing 750 daily flights to compete with American Airlines. With both airlines operating at operational limits, the FAA has threatened to cut 10 percent of traffic. At Houston’s George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH), the recent DHS shutdown led to record TSA callouts and wait times exceeding four hours. Taken together, United has had to balance expansion with constraint.

Against this backdrop, reports emerged that United Airlines CEO Scott Kirby pitched a long-shot merger with rival American Airlines to President Donald Trump. The move would create the most powerful airline in the world, though experts indicate it would likely be blocked by the Department of Transportation (DOT) on antitrust grounds. Neither Trump nor Isom commented.

A merger would nearly monopolize major U.S. airports. At O’Hare, the combined airline would control roughly 75 percent of traffic, while at Dallas-Fort Worth it would approach 85 percent.

Recent airline mergers have faced similar resistance. In 2023, the DOT broke up American and JetBlue’s “Northeast Alliance,” and JetBlue’s attempted acquisition of Spirit in 2022 was also blocked over concerns about higher fares for price-sensitive consumers.

Despite this, some suggest Kirby may be acting tactically—using the proposal to pursue a smaller acquisition such as JetBlue, which has been exploring a sale after being blocked from acquiring Spirit.

But this is where the contradiction becomes impossible to ignore: Airlines can add routes, improve lounges, and introduce premium products, but they cannot increase the capacity of the U.S. air travel system. Government shutdowns have exposed severe understaffing in air traffic control, pushing the system toward a breaking point. Terminals are busier, wait times are longer, and delays continue to build as technology ages.

Congestion has long characterized major American airports, but recent near-misses, runway incidents, and mid-air collisions serve as a warning to both regulators and airlines. While expansion embodies American growth, safety is increasingly the priority.

For Boston College students, this reality is not abstract. Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) is one of the most delay-prone airports in the Northeast. With high passenger volume and multiple airline hubs, the airport is frequently pushed to capacity.

In conclusion, America’s aviation industry may be getting bigger and more premium, but structural issues—staffing shortages, aging technology, and rising demand—are beginning to show. The DOT must act to limit excessive traffic, and Congress must invest in infrastructure to ensure airports are equipped to handle the realities of 2026. Until then, rapid expansion will continue to hit constraints, with passengers ultimately paying the price.